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JURISDICTION 
The final order of the district court was entered on October 27,2006. The notice 
of appeal was filed on November 16, 2006. This Court transferred the appeal to the court 
of appeals on December 14, 2006, and then recalled that transfer on May 2, 2007. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In this case, a landowner physically guarded a roadway that crossed her property 
for a twenty-four hour period once every seven years from 1964 to 1999, but never 
encountered or prevented a single member of the public from using the roadway. Rather, 
for a thirty year period (1966-1996) the public made use of the roadway whenever and as 
often as they found it convenient and necessary. The question presented is whether the 
twenty-four hour roadblocks precluded the trial court from declaring the roadway 
dedicated to the public under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The trial court's ultimate determination of whether the 
facts of this case satisfy the requirements of section 72-5-104(1) is a mixed question of 
fact and law. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997). 
"When reviewing a district court's conclusion regarding a mixed question of fact and 
law, [this Court] typically grant[s] some level of deference to the district court's 
application of the law to the facts." Searle v. Milbum Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, f 16, 
133 P.3d 382. Because the legal requirements of a public highway determination under 
section 72-5-104(1) are "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous," trial courts 
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are granted "significant discretion" in applying the facts to the statute in determining 
whether the roadway at issue is a public highway. Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. 
Proof of dedication must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See id. 
PRESERVATION. Prisbrey states one issue on appeal, but raises three, and does 
not attempt to show that any of the issues he presents were preserved in the trial court 
below. The issue, as framed above, was preserved in and was the heart of the dispute 
before the trial court. (R. 92-102, 104-114, 197 Tr. 213:10-25.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Of central importance to this appeal is Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), the public 
dedication statute, which provides: 
A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). 
The dedication statute was previously codified as section 27-12-89 of the Utah 
Code. In 1998 the dedication statute was renumbered as section 72-5-104(1). For 
consistency and ease of reference, this brief refers to the statute according to its present 
designation in the Utah Code. See Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, <p 
n.4, 153 P.3d 745 (noting that current version of dedication statute is substantially 
identical to prior version). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On February 23, 2006, the Town of Leeds filed this action in the Fifth District 
Court for Washington County to have West Center Street in Leeds declared a public 
highway under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). (R. 1, 177 ^ [11.) Leeds also sought a 
temporary restraining order and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant landowner, Terry 
Prisbrey, from obstructing and otherwise destroying any portion of West Center Street. 
(R. 24, 177 Ull.) 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Leeds' application for injunctive 
relief. (R. 196, 197, 198 (hearing transcripts).) Upon stipulation of the parties, the 
hearing was consolidated with the trial of the action on the merits. (R. 178-79.) On 
October 27, 2007, the trial court entered its final judgment declaring West Center Street a 
public highway under section 72-5-104(1) and permanently enjoining Prisbrey from 
taking any action to block or otherwise inhibit vehicular or pedestrian traffic along West 
Center Street. (R. 173-74.) This appeal followed. 
IL STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
There is a roadway within the Town of Leeds named West Center Street. (R. 176 
|1.) West Center Street originates at an intersection with Old Highway 91 and extends 
north to the crest of a small incline and then downhill across certain real property to a 
narrow "box" underpass beneath Interstate 15 to an area known as Angel Springs. (R. 
1
 The facts of this case, as found by the trial court, are undisputed and 
unchallenged on appeal. 
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176 Tfl.) The box underpass was constructed in 1964-65, at which time West Center 
Street was repositioned to its present location. (R. 176 %2.) 
Terry Prisbrey, the defendant/appellant in this litigation, currently owns the real 
property across which West Center Street extends. (R. 17611.) In 2000, Prisbrey 
purchased the property from Joanne George. (R. 176 ^ 3.) Mrs. George and her family 
had owned the property since 1964. (R. 176.) During that time, in October of every 
seventh year—beginning in 1964, and again in October 1971, 1978, 1985, 1992, and 
1999—Mrs. George either by herself or with help from her family, went to West Center 
Street and, at the peak of the road (which appears on Exhibit No. 7 as the juncture of a 
"Y,") established a roadblock by guarding the road for a twenty-four hour period. (R. 
176 W 
The roadblocks generally consisted of Mrs. George or her sons' physical presence 
and the placement of sawhorses across the road. (R. 176 ^ f5.) During these twenty-four 
hour roadblocks, Mrs. George never encountered anyone attempting to travel West 
Center Street and knew of no one that was prevented from traveling West Center Street 
because of her blockades. (R. 177 ^ |7.) Rather, for a thirty year period (1966-1996), 
members of the public used West Center Street whenever they found it necessary or 
convenient and did so without the need of obtaining permission. (R. 177 Tf8.) 
Recently, Prisbrey, who claims West Center Street is a private road, has attempted 
to restrict travel across the road by erecting a chain link fence across the road at the 
southernmost edge of his property and at the entrance into the "box" tunnel. (R. 177 ^9.) 
He also affixed two "no trespassing" signs on the chain link fence. (R. 12, 177 TJ10.) 
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In response, Leeds filed an action in the Fifth District Court to have West Center 
Street deemed a dedicated public right of way pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5-
104(1). (R. 1, 177 Tfl 1.) In addition, Leeds sought a temporary restraining order and 
injunctive relief to enjoin Prisbrey from obstructing and otherwise destroying any portion 
of West Center Street, and requiring him to remove the gates and signage constructed 
across the road. (R. 24, 177 [^11.) 
The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing in which it considered the 
testimony of Mrs. George and members of the public concerning their use of West Center 
Street. (R. 196 Tr. passim, 197 Tr. passim.) Mrs. George testified as to her and her 
family's twenty-four roadblocks. (R. 176 ^ 4.) She also testified, and the trial court found 
that "[d]uring her 24-hour road blockades, Mrs. George never encountered anyone in the 
process and cannot testify that she knew of anyone who was precluded from traveling 
along the road because of her blockades." (R. \ll\l.) 
Rather, based on the testimony of numerous witnesses, the trial court found that 
"[f]rom the time period 1966 through 1996, members of the public used West Center 
Street whenever they found it necessary and/or convenient and did so without the need of 
obtaining permission." (R. 177^8.) 
Specifically, L. Merlin Sullivan, a life long resident of Leeds, testified that he used 
West Center Street at least five days per week from the period 1964 to 1995. (R. 197 Tr. 
14:18-25; 16:21-25; 22:19-21.) He testified that his use of West Center Street was 
unrestricted and never blocked by any person during that period and that he never needed 
permission to use the road. (Id. 20:12-21.) In fact, Mr. Sullivan had always thought 
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West Center Street was a public roadway. {Id. 30:7-25; 32:21-25.) Furthermore, he 
witnessed other members of the public using West Center Street "constantly" during this 
period of time. {Id. 18:11-19.) 
Ray Beal has also lived in Leeds most of his life. (7^.37:22-24.) Mr. Beal 
testified that during the time period 1966 to 1996, he and his family used West Center 
Street two to three times per month, whenever they believed it convenient and necessary, 
and were never prohibited from using the road. {Id. 48:9-25; 49-50.) 
Russell Peine has lived in Leeds since 1972. {Id. 58:16.) Since that time to 
approximately 1995 he and his family used West Center Street at least once per week, 
sometimes every day, to ride their motorcycles. {Id. 64:9-25, 65:1-18.) They freely used 
the road whenever they wanted. {Id. 64:13-17.) During this time period, Mr. Peine also 
viewed consistent vehicular traffic on the road. {Id. 64:19-25, 65:1-16.) 
Ben Lott and his family used West Center Street two to four times per day from 
1992 to 1996, and witnessed other members of the public freely using the road. {Id. 
76:14-20, 77:22-24, 78:19-22.) Donald Goddard traveled West Center Street several 
times during each month from 1965 to 1996, and was never prohibited from using the 
road during that period of time. {Id. 90:8-17.) Steven Lewis, Leeds' fire chief, used 
West Center Street several times per week from 1991 to 1996, whenever he found it 
necessary and convenient to do so, and was not prevented from doing so. {Id. 96:12-14, 
99:2-12.) 
In addition to hearing witness testimony and viewing documentary evidence, the 
trial court judge actually went on site to view and travel along West Center Street. (R. 
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197 Tr. 217:3-7, 219:1-4; R. 196 Tr. 19:21-25, 20:1-3.) At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the trial court summarized the issue: 
Mr. Prisbrey's predecessor in interest undertook an act over a 24-
hour period of time, some of which, of course, was in dark and some if it 
had to be in daylight . . . — every seven years, and yet the testimony in 
front of me is very clear that no one was stopped. No member of the 
public was ever encountered 
Mr. Prisbrey, on the contrary, did it the way that, frankly, I think any 
effective person would do it. He built a fence, put posts in the middle of it, 
drug chain link across it, put a sign up to, and did what it strikes me any 
claiming landowner would do in the face of a public use like that so that he 
didn't have to be there standing sentry. The public would be placed on 
notice by virtue of the chain link, by the posts, by that very lengthy and 
most articulate sign2 that he has telling the public exactly what the right is. 
That appears to me to be the analytical distinction between the acts 
made by Mr. Prisbrey—and Mr. Prisbrey's acts are very clear—and the 
possibly ambiguous acts or at least lack of notice acts that are indicated in a 
sentry duty that encounters no one. That's really what my problem is with 
it there. 
(R. 196 Tr. 7:15-25, 8:1-14) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the trial court then reasoned: 
There must be some notice to the public and some effective action 
blocking the public's travel so that the public will know that there is not a 
clear right of way there. 
My reasoning goes basically within the structure of this lawsuit. Mr. 
Prisbrey did what a reasonable landowner would do when faced with a 
portion of their property being taken by the public. He built a fence, he dug 
the post holes, he put up the steel and he strung the chain link and did the 
blocking. That's the way you give notice to the public as clearly as he did. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Prisbrey's standpoint, the horse was already 
out of the barn, and that this had been a public right of way established 
2
 This was a reference to Prisbrey's no trespassing and other signs that he posted 
across West Center Street. (R. 12.) 
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through the box tunnel on 1-15 on the west side of [West] Center Street ever 
since the freeway was built in 1964 of 5 or 6, for as long as it has been 
there. 
(R. 196 Tr. 21:15-25,22:1-3.) 
Applying the requirements of Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), the trial court 
concluded that Leeds presented clear and convincing evidence that the public made 
continuous use of West Center Street as a public thoroughfare for a period often years 
(1966 to 1996). (R. 178 Tfijl-6.) Accordingly, the trial court concluded, as a matter of 
law, that West Center Street is a dedicated public highway. (R. 178 ^ |6.) The parties 
agreed that the evidentiary hearing on the injunction would be consolidated with the trial 
on the merits. (R. 178-7917.) As a result, final judgment was entered in favor of Leeds 
on October 27, 2006. (R. 173.) 
Prisbrey appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. For a roadway to become a public highway by dedication under Utah Code 
section 72-5-104(1) there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) 
for a period often years. This determination is a fact intensive inquiry that is not capable 
of being reduced to a bright line rule. For this reason both this Court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals have consistently deferred to trial courts to find the facts on a case-by-case 
basis and apply them to the broad legal standard to determine whether the facts equate to 
public dedication as a matter of law. 
In this case, the trial court made an undisputed factual finding that no member of 
the public was prevented from using West Center Street by Mrs. George's roadblocks. It 
STG 11398.5 Q 
made an undisputed factual finding that for a thirty year period members of the public 
used West Center Street whenever they wanted, as often as they wanted. It made an 
undisputed factual finding that the public used West Center Street without the necessity 
of obtaining permission. Therefore, as a matter of law, West Center Street is a dedicated 
public road under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). 
Prisbrey asks this Court to ignore all of facts and evidence and establish a bright 
line rule in which the mere periodic guarding of a roadway, without more, bars 
continuous use. His argument is grounded in his claim that during the period of Mrs. 
George's roadblocks one hundred percent of all potential traffic was prohibited from 
using West Center Street. Public dedication cases, however, are determined by facts, not 
arbitrary and unrealistic assumptions that all roads in Utah are being used twenty-four 
hours per day, 365 days per year. Because Prisbrey does not challenge the undisputed 
facts which establish continuous use of West Center Street by the public for an over ten 
year period, the trial court's legal conclusion should be affirmed. 
2. Prisbrey's second argument attempts to revive landowner intent as an 
element in determining public dedication. This Court, however, has expressly abandoned 
intent, implied or otherwise, as a factor to be considered in public dedication cases. 
Looking at a landowner's intent to dedicate a roadway to the public is not in accord with 
the plain language of section 72-5-104(1), which contains no intent element. Rather, all 
that is required is continuous use as a public thoroughfare for a ten year period. Because 
these elements are undisputedly present here, the trial court should be affirmed. 
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3. Finally, Prisbrey argues that Mrs. George's closing and "re-opening" of 
West Center Street every seven years equates to implied permission and therefore defeats 
the public thoroughfare element of public dedication. Prisbrey, however, completely 
ignores and does not challenge the trial court's factual finding that the public used West 
Center Street without the necessity of obtaining permission. Moreover, the case law 
Prisbrey relies on to support his argument is factually distinguishable. He relies on a case 
in which permission was implied where the landowner opened the roadway at issue for a 
specific class of people, at specific times of the year, for a specific use. No such facts are 
present in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Three elements are necessary for a road to become a public highway by dedication 
under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). There must be "(0 continuous use, (ii) as a public 
thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 
310 (Utah 1997). This Court has broadly defined the continuous use element as a 
question of whether the "evidence demonstrates that the public 'made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the [road in question] 'as often as they found it convenient and 
necessary.'" Id at 311 (quoting Bover v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 
(1958)). 
The second element, use as a public thoroughfare, requires passing or travel by the 
public other than by permission or private right. See id. at 311. The third element simply 
requires a ten year period of continuous use as a public thoroughfare. See id. The 
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proponent of dedication must establish these elements by clear and convincing evidence. 
See id. at 310. 
This legal framework is general by design. As this Court stated in Heber City 
Corp., "[t]he issues presented under section [72-5-104(1)] . . . do not lend themselves 
well to close review by this court, as we would be hard-pressed to establish a coherent 
and consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court 
rulings." 942 P.2d at 310. As such, trial courts are granted "significant discretion" in 
applying the facts to the statute in determining whether the roadway at issue meets the 
legal requirements for becoming a dedicated public highway. Id 
In short, cases arising under section 72-5-104(1) turn on their facts. Here, Prisbrey 
does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. As such, this Court assumes the 
record supports the trial court's factual findings and simply reviews the trial court's 
application of the law to those facts, granting the trial court significant discretion. See id. 
at 310, 312. 
I. DETERMINING PUBLIC DEDICATION UNDER SECTION 72-5-104(1) IS 
A FACT INTENSIVE INQUIRY THAT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO A 
BRIGHT LINE RULE. 
A. It Is Undisputed That The Public Made Continuous And 
Uninterrupted Use Of West Center Street As Often As They Found It 
Convenient And Necessary. 
Prisbrey's principal argument on appeal is that the trial court's finding that West 
Center Street was blocked for a twenty-four hour period once every seven years from 
1964 to 1999, precludes the legal conclusion that the public's use of West Center Street 
was a continuous use for purposes of the statute. (Appellant's Br. at 8-15.) He asks this 
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Court to ignore the totality of facts and evidence and establish a bright line rule in which 
the mere periodic guarding of a roadway, without more, bars continuous use. 
As stated, the standard for determining continuous use under section 72-5-104(1) 
has long been a question of whether the "evidence demonstrates that the public 'made a 
continuous and uninterrupted use of the [road in question] 'as often as they found it 
convenient and necessary.'" Heber City Corp.. 942 P.2d at 311 (quoting Boyer. 326 P.2d 
at 109). This standard does not require that the public travel the road every day or even 
very often. It only requires a showing that members of the public used the road when 
they needed, as often as they needed. See Boyer. 326 P.2d at 108-09; State ex. rel. Div. 
of Forestry. Fire & State Lands v. Six Mile Ranch Co.. 2006 UT App 104, }^13, 132 P.2d 
687 (continuous use need not be constant "provided it occurred as often as the claimant 
had occasion or chose to pass"). 
Prisbrey argues that the public could not have used West Center Street as often as 
they found it convenient and necessary because if they had only traveled the road during 
the twenty-four hour period every seventh October from 1964 to 1999, they would have 
encountered Mrs. George's roadblock and their travel would have been prevented. 
(Appellant's Br. at 10-11.) He calls the fact that no one ever actually encountered the 
roadblock a mere "matter of coincidence." {Id. at 11.) According to Prisbrey, then, 
interruption is determined in the abstract, not by the facts. 
Yet, it is undisputed that for a thirty year period, members of the public did in fact 
use West Center Street whenever they wanted, and as often as they wanted. In other 
words, they used West Center Street whenever they found it convenient and necessary 
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and did so whenever the occasion presented itself. This is the definition of a continuous 
public use. See Boyer, 326 P.2d at 108-09 (affirming dedication determination where 
evidence showed that whenever the public desired to use the road, they did so). As the 
trial court determined, Mrs. George's roadblocks simply did nothing to interrupt the 
public's continuous use of West Center Street. According to the trial court, the 
roadblocks did not even provide notice to the public that Mrs. George was attempting to 
prevent the public's use of West Center Street. 
Further, while Prisbrey asks this Court to decide this case on a single fact, the law 
requires that "all of the facts should be considered together[.]" Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 
Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966). Considering all the of the facts together led 
the trial court here to find that, despite Mrs. George's roadblocks, the public made a free 
and uninterrupted use of West Center Street whenever they found it necessary and 
convenient and without the necessity of obtaining permission. (R. 178 ^|4.)3 The trial 
court was not making new law. It was simply applying the facts to an established legal 
standard. This standard does not require that the public travel or use the road in question 
every day, but only "as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Boyer, 326 P.2d 
at 109. 
To be sure, Prisbrey's contention is grounded in his claim that during the period of 
Mrs. George's roadblocks one hundred percent of all possible traffic was prevented from 
3
 Although this reasoning stems from the trial court's public thoroughfare 
determination, the continuous use and public thoroughfare elements are so intertwined 
that analysis applicable to one often overlaps with the other. See Heber City Corp., 942 
P.2dat310n.6. 
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using West Center Street. (Appellant's Br. at 12.) He would have this Court adopt a 
legal standard for continuous use that requires trial courts to surrender their fact finding 
responsibilities and instead apply a pre-fabricated assumption that all roadways in Utah 
are being used twenty-four hours per day, 365 days per year. It is the province of an 
appellate court to say what the law is. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994), 
modified impart by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096. Requiring trial courts to 
apply arbitrary and unrealistic factual assumptions as opposed to legal standards and rules 
does not easily fit within this definition. 
Conversely, it is not the trial court's role to make arbitrary and unrealistic factual 
assumptions and apply them to established legal standards. "Trial courts are given 
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
"Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, 
events, actions, or conditions happening, existing or taking place, as well as the 
subjective, such as state of mind." Id at 935. Thus, a trial court should find facts and 
weigh evidence as to what actually occurs on the roadway at issue in the case brought 
before it and then apply those facts to the legal standard set forth in the statute and as 
defined by this Court. 
Here, the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses. It traveled to and 
viewed the road in question. It made an undisputed factual finding that no member of the 
public was prevented from using West Center Street by Mrs. George's roadblocks. It 
made an undisputed factual finding that for a thirty year time period members of the 
public used West Center Street whenever they wanted, as often as they wanted. It made 
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an undisputed factual finding that the public used West Center Street without the 
necessity of obtaining permission. 
Therefore, under this set of facts, as it relates to West Center Street in Leeds, Utah, 
the twenty-four hour, once every seventh October roadblocks were not enough to prevent 
the public's continuous use of West Center Street as a public thoroughfare for a thirty 
year period. Therefore, as a matter of law, West Center Street is a dedicated public road 
under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). 
Because the ultimate legal conclusion did not violate established legal standards 
for determining public dedication, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
B. Prisbrey's Proposed Bright Line Rule Is Unworkable As A Legal 
Standard. 
Aside from marking a substantial departure from established Utah law,4 there are 
additional problems with Prisbrey's proposed bright line rule. Under his proposed rule, a 
landowner could simply go out onto a roadway at least once within every ten year period 
of time, stand in the middle, and declare the roadway closed. At that point in time one 
hundred percent of all possible traffic would be prevented from using the road. Never 
mind whether the roadblock was actually effective in stopping any member of the public 
from traveling the road. And never mind that the public actually used the road whenever 
In this regard, in arguing for this bright line rule, Prisbrey is necessarily asking 
this Court to depart from the long line of precedent that requires each case be decided on 
its facts. He does not, however, attempt to make the extraordinary showing required for 
this Court cast aside stare decisis and overrule precedent. See Laney v. Fairview City, 
2002 UT 79,1J145-46, 57 P.3d 1007 (setting forth demonstration that must be made for 
court to overturn prior precedent). 
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it was necessary and convenient. The landowner's testimony of the temporary road 
closure is all that would be required. It is this type of self-serving testimony, however, 
that both this Court and the court of appeals have condemned in dedication cases. See 
Peterson v. Combe. 20 Utah 2d 376, 378, 438 P.2d 545, 547 (1968); Wasatch County v. 
Okelberrv, 2006 UT App 473, Tfl7, 153 P.3d 745, cert granted, No. 20070011-SC (Utah 
March 15, 2007). 
Moreover, while asking this Court to adopt a bright line rule, Prisbrey fails to 
explain or define how it would work. Would it require a twenty-four hour roadblock? 
Given that no one encountered Mrs. George's roadblock, should the requirement be 
extended to forty-eight hours? Or forty-eight hours for rural roads and twenty-four hours 
for urban roads? Is it enough to establish the roadblock on a weekend or should it be 
during the weekday? What about holidays? And what time of the day? The trial court in 
the instant case made mention of the fact that Mrs. George's twenty-four hour roadblocks 
would include the nighttime hours—implying that it was unlikely that anyone would 
actually encounter the roadblock at that time. Should the standard then be twenty-four 
hours, on weekdays, during regular business hours? 
These questions, of course, cannot be answered. There is no one size fits all rule 
that is capable of definition. Attempting to define such a rule merely serves to reinforce 
this Court's statement in Heber City Corp. that it "would be hard-pressed to establish a 
coherent and consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of 
trial court rulings." 942 P.2d at 301. Indeed, the fact intensive nature of these cases 
shows why precedent is often an unhelpful guide. Our research has revealed no 
STG_11398.5 1fi 
published appellate decision in Utah like the instant case in which the owner actually 
stands watch for a twenty-four period once every several years but does nothing else in 
the interim to prevent or even provide notice that travel is prohibited. 
The closest examples are cases involving gates. But even cases involving gates 
turn on their unique facts. For example, in Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 
809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination 
that continuous public use was not shown where there was evidence that travel was 
barred by a locked gate and several members of the public were unable to use the road 
because of the locked gate. Conversely, in Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 
147 P.3d 963, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination of continuous 
public use despite the existence of a gate because the trial court found that the gates were 
generally unlocked and used to restrict the travel of livestock, not people. See id. at [^15. 
In AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, 112 P.3d 1228, continuous use was 
affirmed despite "no trespass" signs and other physical obstructions because the 
obstructions were determined to prevent trespassing on property adjacent to the road as 
opposed to the road itself. See id. ffl[14-15. See generally Okelberry. 2006 UT App 473 
at TJ15 (collecting cases in which blockage of the road by a gate is only one fact that was 
weighed by courts in making public dedication determination). 
In sum, a bright line test is unworkable. It is incapable of any meaningful 
definition. It would simply strip a trial court of its duties to consider all of the facts and 
evidence before it and encourage the self serving testimony that both this Court and the 
court of appeals have previously condemned. 
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Again, this case turns on its facts. And under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the trial court weighed the evidence and concluded that even though Mrs. George 
blocked West Center Street for twenty-four hours every seven years, it was insufficient as 
a matter of law to prevent public dedication because the public used West Center Street 
whenever it wanted, as often as it wanted. Under the facts and circumstances of this 
particular case, in this rural town in Washington County, on this roadway, Mrs. George's 
efforts were not sufficient. It is the province of the trial court to make that determination. 
Its determination should be affirmed. 
C. The Fate Of West Center Street Is Not Inextricably Intertwined With 
The Fate Of The Four Roads At Issue In Okelberry. 
Prisbrey spends most of his brief arguing against the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision in the Okelberry case, which is currently before this Court on certiorari. See 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, |17, 153 P.3d 745, cert granted, No. 
20070011-SC (Utah March 15, 2007). Specifically, he (as well as amicus curiae Brigham 
Young University) attack the "balancing test" utilized by the Okelberry court in affirming 
the trial court's dedication determination. There, the court of appeals stated that a trial 
court should weigh the evidence regarding the duration and frequency of the blockage of 
a road against the frequency and volume of public use to determine whether there is clear 
and convincing evidence of continuous public use. See Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473 at 
^18. Both Prisbrey and BYU argue this is unworkable. 
The outcome of the instant case, however, is not inextricably intertwined with the 
outcome in Okelberry. As an initial matter, the trial court in the instant case did not 
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follow or rely on Okelberry. Indeed, it entered its decision in this case one month prior 
(October 27, 2006) to the court of appeals issuance of the Okelberry decision (November 
30, 2006). 
More importantly, the facts in this case are distinguishable from those in 
Okelberry. In Okelberry, there was uncontested evidence that there were gates on the 
roadways that were "locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on 
the gates and property which stated 'No Trespassing - Private Property.'" Okelberry, 
2006 UT App 473 at Tf5. Further, there was testimony that employees of the landowners 
"asked people trespassing on the property or the roads to leave." Id. The question 
ultimately presented in Okelberry, which gave rise to the "balancing test" that is presently 
under siege by Prisbrey and B YU, is whether these undisputed acts were an interruptive 
event sufficient to defeat a claim of continuous use. See id. at ^  14. The court of appeals 
deferred to the trial court and answered in the negative, ultimately affirming the trial 
court's determination that the "Four Roads" at issue were dedicated to the public under 
section 72-5-104(1). See id. at THf 19-20. 
The instant case presents no similar challenge. Here, no one encountered a closed 
gate. No one encountered a sign. No one was asked to leave by Mrs. George or her 
family. No one encountered any resistance whatsoever to their traveling on West Center 
Street during the thirty year period at issue. At best, there was an interruptive event in 
the abstract, which, as set forth above, is not an interruptive event at all. 
Thus, if this Court determines to reject the approach taken by the court of appeals 
in Okelberry. and hold that a single act of interruption or a combination of acts as 
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described in Okelberry (the gate, the signs, the actual ejectment of trespassers from the 
roadways) were sufficient to prevent continuous use a matter of law, it should still affirm 
the trial court here. Regardless of the court of appeals' analysis in Okelberry, the facts 
still govern the outcome of public dedication cases. See Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 
310. There is a quite a difference in balancing the degree of an interruptive event in 
relation to use of the roadway and balancing an event which causes no interruption at all. 
The latter requires no balancing. The latter is at issue here. Prisbrey and BYU are 
ultimately concerned about how to quantify and measure facts but there is simply nothing 
to quantify and measure in this case. 
In sum, the instant case should be decided on its facts. Regardless of the fate of 
the Four Roads in Okelberry, West Center Street should remain a public highway by 
dedication. The trial court should be affirmed. 
II. A LANDOWNER'S INTENT TO ABANDON A ROADWAY, IMPLIED OR 
OTHERWISE, IS NOT A FACTOR IN DETERMINING PUBLIC 
DEDICATION UNDER SECTION 72-5-104(1). 
Prisbrey's second argument on appeal is that intent to abandon a roadway is still 
required for dedication under section 72-5-104(1). (Appellant's Br. at 16-20.) While 
acknowledging that this Court has abandoned the intent element of dedication, he argues 
that "inferred intent from acquiescence in the continual use by the public [is] still 
required." {Id. at 17.) Thus, as his argument goes, because Mrs. George guarded West 
Center Street every seven years, intent cannot be inferred by acquiescence. This 
argument fails for two reasons. 
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First, Prisbrey fails to point to anywhere in the record where this argument was 
preserved, as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Issues raised on appeal must first be presented to the trial court in a 
specific and timely manner with supporting evidence and legal authority so the trial court 
has the first opportunity to rule on that issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Failure to properly preserve the issue below waives that issue 
on appeal. See id. Because Prisbrey has not attempted to make this showing, as required 
by rule, this Court should consider the issue waived. 
Second, he is wrong. Intent was once one of the factors used to determine the 
public thoroughfare element of the dedication statute. See Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 
311. This Court made clear in Heber City Corp., however, that it has abandoned this 
factor as part of the public dedication analysis. See id. Requiring intent to establish 
public dedication is simply not in accord with the plain language of section 72-5-104(1), 
which contains no such requirement. See Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 
1981). 
Section 72-5-104(1) merely requires continuous use as a public thoroughfare for 
ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). Courts interpret statutes according to their 
plain language and will not imply that which is not present in the plain language of the 
statute. See Bilanzich v. Lonettt 2007 UT 26,1J13, 574 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; Belnorth 
Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating 
"[i]nasmuch as the legislature chose not to include such a provision [in the statute], we 
may not imply one"). 
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Thus, in Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 
1981), this Court responded to a similar argument concerning implied intent by 
acquiescence by stating, without equivocation, that "[t]here is no need to prove a 
landowner's intent." Id. at 213. Rather, "'[s]ection [72-5-104(1)] deems a dedication as 
a matter of law when the required public use is established.'" Id. (quoting Thurman, 626 
P.2dat449). 
The sole basis for Prisbrey's argument is language from this Court's opinion in 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), that "intent may be 
inferred by the mere acquiescence in allowing the public to use the road." Id. at 1099. 
"[T]his Court is bound by holdings, not language." Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 
275, 282-84 (2001). The isolated statement in Draper City has no application to the 
public dedication determination as expressed in this Court's most recent decision on the 
issue, Heber City Corp., and has no support in the plain language of the statute. To the 
extent it remains a lingering question, this Court should clarify the matter and disavow 
the isolated statement in Draper City. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING THAT WEST CENTER 
STREET WAS USED BY THE PUBLIC WITHOUT PERMISSION IS NOT 
DISPUTED. 
Prisbrey's final argument attacks the public thoroughfare element of the dedication 
statute. He argues that because Mrs. George blocked, then reopened West Center Street 
every seven years, members of the public using West Center Street were using it with her 
"implied permission" and therefore no dedication was made. (Appellant's Br. at 20-21.) 
This argument founders for several reasons. 
First, like his implied intent argument, he fails to comply with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) 
and does not show that he preserved his implied permission argument in the trial court. 
Without such a showing this Court should deem the argument waived for appeal. See 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. 
Second, he focuses on one factual finding—Mrs. George's twenty-four hour 
roadblocks—to "imply" permission, while ignoring the trial court's factual finding that 
"[f]rom 1966 through 1996, members of the public used West Center Street whenever 
they found it necessary and/or convenient and without the need of obtaining 
permission." (R. 177 |^8) (Emphasis added.) Prisbrey fails to challenge this factual 
finding on appeal and therefore it is presumed correct. See Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 
312. Further, Prisbrey cannot lodge an indirect challenge to a factual finding by implying 
something from a different factual finding. Rather, to challenge the factual finding that 
the public used West Center Street without the necessity of obtaining permission Prisbrey 
is required to first marshal the evidence in support of that finding and then demonstrate 
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why the evidence is legally insufficient to support it, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the finding. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. He 
failed to do so and therefore cannot now argue against the finding. 
And third, Prisbrey's argument has no legal support. It is based on Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), as stated in Six Mile Ranch Co., 
2006 UT App 104,1fl[22-23, 132 P.3d 687. In Campbell however, the gate barring travel 
on the roadway at issue was unlocked for hunting season for use by hunters and then 
locked at the end of hunting season. See Campbell 962 P.2d at 809. There, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the roadway at issue was not a public 
thoroughfare because, under the circumstances, the hunters were using the roadway with 
the landowner's permission, which was easily implied from the locking and unlocking of 
the gate. See id. 
No similar circumstances are present here. Mrs. George was not simply allowing 
the passage of specific groups over West Center Street for a specific purpose. She was 
attempting to prevent travel. The fact that she only did so for a twenty-four hour period 
every seven years cannot be implied to mean that all other travel in the interim was by 
permission. Prisbrey cites no law that stands for such a general and sweeping 
proposition. Prisbrey's argument is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court. 
DATED THIS 14th day of May 2007. 
Pattison 
DUIJMAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Heath H. Snow 
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
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Attorneys for the Town of Leeds 
STG 11398.5 O * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I, Bryan J. Pattison, certify that on May 
14,2007,1 caused two copies of the BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TOWN OF LEEDS to be served 
upon counsel for Appellant, via first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to the 
following address: 
Jeffrey C. Peatross 
RANNEY & PEATROSS 
P.O. Box 1662 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Attorney for Appellant 
B R Y M J. PATTISON 
Tab A 
D «AL 
Heath H. Snow, Esq., Utah Bar #8563 
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP 
Attorney for Town of Leeds 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsnow.com 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




TERRY PRISBREY, an individual: 
DEFENDANT DOES and all other persons or 
entities unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the pleading adverse to 




(Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief) 
Civil No.: 060500408 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-captioned parties, present in person and by legal counsel came on before the 
Court on the 20th day of July, 2006 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. for the conclusion of a temporary 
restraining order hearing which first commenced on March 28, 2006 and was continued in the 
form of an evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2006. Having considered the testimonial, 
documentary and other evidence and the argument of counsel and having the made separate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are entered concurrently herewith, and for 
good cause showing: 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Plaintiff, the Town of Leeds, that the historic right of vray commonly 
known as West Center Street is a dedicated public right of way pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
72-5-104(1). That a certified copy of this Judgment may be recorded in the Official Records 
of Washington County maintained in the Office of the Recorder, Washington County, State of 
Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant, Terry Prisbrey, and all agents, successors and assigns are hereby permanently 
enjoined from taking any action to block or otherwise inhibit vehicular or pedestrian traffic 
along West Center Street. 
SO ORDERED this £ 7 day of / 0 rT^ , 
BY THE COURT 
2006 
James L. Shumate 
District Court Judge 
* •> 
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Heath H. Snow, Esq., Utah Bar #8563 
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP 
Attorney for Town of Leeds 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsnow.com 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




TERRY PRISBREY, an individual: 
DEFENDANT DOES and all other persons or 
entities unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the pleading adverse to 
the complainant's ownership, or clouding their 
title thereto, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.: 060500408 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-captioned parties, present in person and by legal counsel came on before the 
Court on the 20 day of July, 2006 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. for the conclusion of a temporary 
restraining order hearing which first commenced on March 28,2006 and was continued in the 
form of an evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2006. Having considered the testimonial, documentary 
and other evidence and the argument of counsel, the Court hereby makes the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Within the Town of Leeds there exists a roadway named West Center 
Street ("West Center Street") originating at an intersection with Main Street (Old 
Highway 91) and extending North to the crest of a small incline and then down hill across 
certain real property currently owned by the Defendant (the "Subject Property") to a 
narrow "Box" underpass underneath Interstate 15 to an area known as Angel Springs. 
2. The Box underpass was constructed at the same time that Interstate 15 was 
constructed in 1964-65 at which time West Center Street was repositioned to its present 
location. 
3. Mrs. Joann George and her family owned the Subject Property prior to 
Defendant's purchase in approximately 2000. 
4. In October of every year for seven years, beginning in October of 1964, 
and again in October of 71, 78, 85, 92, and finally in 99, that Mrs. George either solo, or 
with the assistance of her sons, went to the road [West Center Street] in question and at 
the peak of the road, which is on Exhibit No. 7, the juncture of a "Y," established a 
roadblock for twenty-four hours, and she guarded that road in that fashion every seven 
years for twenty-four hours. 
5. The roadblocks generally consisted of her or her sons' physical presence 
and placing sawhorses across the road. 
6. That from the testimony of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Beal, Mr. Peine, Mr. Lott, 
Mr. Goddard, and Chief Lewis that from 1966 until 1996 this road was open, unblocked 
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with the exception of the 24-hour roadblocks, and available to the public without any 
inhibition of travel with possible exception of times during sorghum boiling. 
7. During her 24-hour road blockades, Mrs. George never encountered 
anyone in the process and cannot testify that she knew of anyone who was precluded 
from traveling along the road because of her blockades. 
8. From 1966 through 1996, members of the public used West Center Street 
whenever they found it necessary and/or convenient and without the need of obtaining 
permission. 
9. Recently, the Defendant, who claims West Center Street is a private road, 
has attempted to restrict travel across the same by erecting a chain link fence across the 
road at the southernmost edge of the Subject Property and at the entrance into the "Box" 
tunnel. 
10. Defendant also affixed two no trespassing signs on the chain link fence. 
11. As a result of Defendant's actions, the Town of Leeds filed this action 
seeking to have West Center Street deemed a dedicated public right of way pursuant to § 
72-5-104(1), and sought a temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining 
Defendant from obstructing West Center Street and destroying any portion thereof, and 
specifically requiring Defendant to remove the gates and signage constructed across the 
road. 
Based on these findings of fact, the court makes the following Conclusions of Law 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is an action by Plaintiff, the Town of Leeds, to have West Center deemed a 
dedicated public right of way pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), which provides that "A 
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period often years." 
2. Three factors must be present for a road to become a public highway by 
dedication under Section 72-5-104(1): (i) continuous use (ii) as a public thoroughfare (iii) for a 
period often years. 
3. Members of the public traveled West Center Street from 1966 to 1996 as often as 
they found it convenient or necessary, at times chosen by them and, therefore, the public's use of 
West Center Street was continuous during that period of time. 
4. From 1966 to 1996, there was not sufficient action taken to adequately put the 
public on notice either that permission was needed to use West Center Street nor was there 
sufficient action taken by Mrs. George to obstruct the public's free and unrestricted passing and 
travel on West Center Street; therefore West Center Street was as a public thoroughfare. 
5. The continuous use of West Center Street as a public thoroughfare was made for a 
period often years (1966 to 1996). 
6. Based on clear and convincing evidence provided to the Court, West Center Street 
is a dedicated public road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). 
7. Because the parties, through counsel, stipulated that the evidentiary hearings and 
argument on the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should be consolidated 
with the trial of the action on the merits, and because the Court finds clear and convincing 
evidence that the West Center Street is a dedicated public road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-
5-104(1), judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Town of Leeds that West Center Street is a 
dedicated public right of way. 
8. Defendant is hereby ordered to remove any obstruction and signage constructed 
across West Center Street and is permanently enjoined from taking any further action to block or 
otherwise inhibit vehicular or pedestrian traffic from traveling on West Center Street. 
SO ENTERED this ^ 7 day of October 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
James L. Shumate 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: O^^x 
RANNEY & PEATROSS 
*-^^3effPeatross 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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